The NIS Observed: An Analytical Review
Volume VI, Number 19 (28 November 2001)

Yevgeni Primakov, whose term as prime minister began in September 1998 and coincided with the worsening crisis in Chechnya, described Maskhadov's difficult position in his recent book, VOSEM MESYATSEV PLUS (Moscow: Vargius, 2001, pp. 100-103). Primakov explains that the kidnapping in September 1998 of four foreign telecom workers (three British and one New Zealander) represented a personal affront to Maskhadov, who had been well received in London only a few months earlier. Maskhadov announced that he was taking the search for the hostages and the punishment of the guilty parties under his personal control. This signaled a serious effort to combat the criminal elements. At a rally in October, Maskhadov invoked blood vengeance (krovnaya mest) against those who conduct the hostage trade. Maskhadov demanded that all units not under the control of the general staff be disbanded and that opposition bases be liquidated. At the same time the head of the Shariah security announced that operations to free hostages would be held and criminal groups would be destroyed. These operations, however, were not decisive and the opposition responded with assassination attempts against Maskhadov's allies.

Primakov comments that in the context of these events "It became clear that S Maskhadov thought more and more about advancing Russian-Chechen relations." Hence Primakov persuaded the president to authorize a meeting in Vladikavkaz. Ingushetia's President Ruslan Aushev and South Ossetia's President Alexander Dzasokhov served as intermediaries for the meeting, which was held on 29 October 1998. The main discussion between Maskhadov and Primakov took place behind closed doors. Here is how Primakov describes it:

This is what I learned from that conversation: Maskhadov and Basaev don't just represent different interests within Chechnya such as different teips [extended family networks], or groups of field commanders -- they also represent different ideologies. In response to my direct question Maskhadov said, "I think that the independent Chechnya should exist in its present boundaries, but Basaev thinks differently. He would like to try the Chechen experiment in other bordering territories, first of all in Dagestan, through which he can seek access to two seas, the Black Sea and the Caspian."

Basaev's program made him Russia's irreconcilable foe whereas Maskhadov showed a willingness to discuss many problems connected with "Chechnya's independence in the context of a single economic space with Russia, single currency" and so forth.

Certain Russian circles have close contacts with Maskhadov's opposition. Specifically he named [Boris] Berezovsky, who, according to him [Maskhadov] "supports them financially, in part through paying ransom for freed hostages, and provides radio communications." Maskhadov said that Berezovsky's main partner was Movladi Udugov at that time the Chechen 'foreign minister.'

Maskhadov was counting on us to support him with arms, money, and to help restore, not so much Grozny, as four or five main industrial plants -- mainly of the petrochemical field. He wanted the reconstruction of these plants to be accomplished by Russian regions bordering Chechnya. We decided (I had [Sergei] Stepashin, MVD minister and [Ramazan] Abdulatipov, minister for nationalities policies with me) on cooperation between the law-enforcement agencies to combat hostage-taking and criminality, the restoration of several enterprises in Chechnya, paying compensation to victims of the deportations of 1944 who live in Chechnya, and the payment of pensions for Chechen retirees from the federal pension plan.

The main result of the meeting was that in return for Moscow's fulfillment of agreements reached at Vladikavkaz and earlier meetings, Maskhadov promised to "begin a public struggle and finish off the terrorists."

After the Vladikavkaz meeting, Primakov presented a detailed report to Yeltsin and gave the appropriate directives to the ministries concerned. "The president supported the draft decrees for the MVD," writes Primakov. However, Primakov does not say whether the measures were implemented. For his part, Maskhadov removed Movladi Udugov from the position of foreign minister on 30 October, that is, immediately upon his return to Grozny. In this way, Maskhadov signaled his willingness to carry out the agreements reached at Vladikavkaz.

It is clear from Primakov's account that Maskhadov had warned the Russian government that Basaev would try to use force against Dagestan. It is obvious that Maskhadov sought Russian military and political support to suppress criminal elements that were in part funded and manipulated by influential figures in Moscow. The Vladikavkaz meeting seemed to have produced efforts to enlist Russian military support against the criminal elements. Atgeriev's consultations with law enforcement bodies followed on Maskhadov's warnings to Primakov.

So, why the war?
If the Chechen president and the security minister were seeking cooperation with Russian law enforcement against the radical elements, why did Russia go to war against them? Primakov comments in regard to the origins of the first Chechen war that "The main difficulty lay in the fact that the Chechen question was integrated into the main political crisis in Moscow." (p. 96) The same can be said about the origins of the second war. It served Putin's political ambitions to stoke nationalist ferment through a war in Chechnya. As the renowned war correspondent Anna Politkovskaya told her Cambridge audience on 19 November, Russian officers told her repeatedly "we are fighting for a rating" in the presidential elections. Twice in one decade a war in Chechnya was used to resolve a power struggle in the Kremlin.

The current confusion regarding talks between Russian and Chechen representatives reveals that there is still no policy-making process. Talks were held on 18 November between Kremlin envoy Viktor Kazantsev and Chechen negotiator Akhmed Zakaev in the presence of Besim Tibuk, leader of Turkey's Liberal Democratic party who apparently was serving as a guarantor of Zakaev's security. No substantive information about the content of the talks or the subsequent Chechen proposal has been made public. A few days later SPS leader Boris Nemtsov suggested that the leaders of ethnic republics, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, could serve as intermediaries. Plans for drawing up a Chechen constitution were being aired by Beslan Gantemirov, a highly controversial Chechen figure who is now an aide to Kazantsev. Radio Liberty reported on 26 November that Chechen commanders meeting in the south of Chechnya endorsed Maskhadov's efforts to end the war. It also pointed out the complete confusion among the authorities: While Kazantsev speaks of further talks for the specific purpose of ending hostilities, other generals are carrying out massive cleansings aimed explicitly at capturing Maskhadov. Zakev says that the Kremlin is trying to decide whether to end the war or continue it. There is plenty of intrigue and contradictory initiatives, but this hardly adds up to a policy-making process.